Ibn Rušd: Knowledge, pleasures and analogy

Fouad Ben Ahmed

Dar el-Hadith el-Hassania Intitut
of High Islamic Studies, Rabat
benamedf@gmail.com                                                                                                pdfPDF

Much[1] has been written about Aristotle’s treatment of knowledge, pleasure and analogy.[2]   Regarding Ibn Rušd (596/1198), however, there are only a few studies that have dealt principally with this topic.[3] This topic brings together logic, psychology, politics, metaphysics, rhetoric, and poetics, which makes my task very hard. Of course, analogy belongs firstly to logic since it is a kind of argument, but it also essentially belongs to the art of rhetoric and – to a lesser extent – to poetry, where we meet the concept of analogy under the name “likeness”, “comparison” or “metaphor”. One can note, in the same vein, that pleasure is a psychological concept. Nevertheless, given that rhetoric uses emotions and passions, Ibn Rušd devotes many paragraphs in his Middle Commentary on Rhetoric to the concept of pleasure and pleasuring. Moreover, pleasure was a subject of a special exploration in the Long Commentary on Metaphysic, where one can meet a new view of Ibn Rušd on persistence of pleasure, which poses many doctrinal difficulties. In addition to that, the end of the Commentary on Plato’s Politics joins this metaphysical position, where Ibn Rušd introduces the intellectual pleasure as the climax of all other kinds of pleasures.

Given the multiplicity of purposes and challenges of every discipline, the difficulty is, also, in the multiplicity of links and relationship between these notions. One may feel that he is before a complex conceptual web, a web that covers most of philosophical areas in the Middle Ages. These notions are shared between many arts, but they do not have the same meaning. Therefore, every art marks this notion with its specific sign. My task is to look for the meanings of these words within those arts and then later to inquire whether there are links between his account of knowledge, pleasure and analogy in the arts.

1. Pleasure, Imagination, habit and Time

In his Middle Commentary on Rhetoric, Ibn Rušd defines pleasure as follows: ‘Pleasure is a change to a disposition that is suddenly generated by a natural feeling through the thing that is felt. I mean when the thing that is felt is natural to the feeling.’[4]

In this definition, Ibn Rušd stresses at least four major ideas:

– Pleasure is a change.

– A sudden occurrence of a new disposition in the soul.

– A natural sensation as the cause of this new disposition.

– And a natural relationship between the sense and the object of sense.

It appears that there are two sources of pleasure: the first is natural, which is one we have delight in ‘willingly’[5]; the second is not natural, but we can get delight from by ‘habit’[6]. At first glance, it seems that Ibn Rušd introduces these sources of pleasure – nature and habit – as if they are incompatible, but for human beings this is not true. The function of ‘to get used to’ and of time is the elimination of the chasm between the two sources. In fact, since one can do what is pleasant by nature without any coercion, effort, or obligation, which are required by some kinds of work, the oncoming of the habit from the natural is an attempt to overcome these factors.[7]

Is it possible to acquire knowledge without any constraint? How does Ibn Rušd explain that apprehension is a pleasant thing?

 Habit and time are the key to these questions. Ibn Rušd may claim that pleasure is in the habit itself, or habit is one of the pleasant things. Since pleasant things are things that have been felt, it is necessary that those, among them, which have occurred by nature, are more pleasant, especially when this disposition is a passion and not an act. What is by habit becomes enjoyable only because the thing that we get used to becomes like the something that is inherently enjoyable so permanently, that it resembles nature.[8] Indeed, what occurs often is almost the natural thing, which occurs always. Habit is therefore very close to nature.

Time also has a role at the level of divisions and degrees of pleasures. With regard to imagination, although it is a weak sense, it provides us with a sort of pleasure, which means that it reminds a sense, I mean a sense of something seen in the past, because this sense is the origin of the pleasure that one get from the productions of imagination, which are memory or a hope.[9]

One can rearrange the pleasures to three kinds relative to the three dimensions of time, then relative to the degree of their intensity:

– Sense deals with the present, I mean when things felt are present and in action the pleasure takes place in proceeding and feeling them, to sense is specific to the present things. Memory deals with the past, I mean when things felt come under what is past, the pleasure takes place in remembering them: remembering is sensation specific to the past.

–  Hope deals with the future, I mean when future things felt, the pleasure exists in the hope: hope is a sensation specific to the future.

Ibn Rušd here defends a kind of differentiation between the pleasures that one can get from the internal and external senses. However, regarding the imagination he relates the intensity to the way of imagining these past or future things. In many desired objects, the pleasure is not only linked as they are present in fact, that is to say as they are felt, but their pleasure is also linked as they are imagined. That is the reason why a thing, when it is desired by someone, is sometimes a certain pleasure, regardless of how it is remembered. Similarly, whoever hopes to get hold of a thing sometimes finds something positive that will give pleasure to what he longs for. ‘That is why the feverish, whom the doctors prohibited from drinking water, takes pleasure in remembering the time when they were drinking and hoping the cure in order to be able to drink.’ [10]

In sum, the position Ibn Rušd takes here shows the role played by the habit, the time and the manner in the production of pleasure. In other words, time, habit and manner play here the main role to render things pleasant.

It thus appears that the approach pursued in the commentaries on the De Anima[11] and the Middle Commentary on Rhetoric presented pleasure linked with a web of powers, affections and conditions that are connected with one another. What is more they introduced at least two meanings of pleasure, one associated with senses, and the other one is associated with intellect. The first meaning leads us to the concept of pleasure as elaborated upon in the commentaries on Rhetoric, Poetic and parts of Politcs,[12] while the second opens us a metaphysical horizon of pleasure, which Ibn Rušd discusses in his commentaries on the Metaphysics and Politics.

2. Intellectual pleasure: beyond all conflict

The Long Commentary on the Metaphysics provides us with a special conception of pleasure. Although it agrees with a part of what Middle Commentary on Rhetoric said, it directs pleasure toward a new horizon, the purely intellectual. This, if not a divine pleasure, is a place where one can live in perpetual pleasure, beyond all contradictions and sources of conflicts.[13]

He relates pleasure to apprehension, given that the latter is a cause of the former. The argument that proves this is the fact that apprehension, like waking, understanding and feeling, is enjoyable.[14]  However, Ibn Rušd makes a division between the sources of pleasure, I mean between what is an apprehension of something that exists actually and what is an apprehension of something that does not exist actually. [15]  Then, pleasure becomes associated to the first source. In the light of this, hopefulness and remembering, becomes almost a sorrow, because the yearning that precedes the apprehension is rather a pain than a pleasure. [16]  The Middle Commentary on Rhetoric considered hopefulness and remembering as pleasant things because of the fact that the one who hopes and remembers merely imagines that the hoped and remembered thing exist,[17] while the pleasant apprehension, according to the Long Commentary on the Metaphysics is an apprehension of what exists actually, not in potentiality. [18]

Ibn Rušd here might seem to prefer the pleasures of sensation since it is an apprehension of something that exists actually. In fact, however, Ibn Rušd prefers here the apprehension of the intellect because it understands its subject more than any other apprehension, and whenever there is more understanding, there is more pleasure. Who understands more, is more delighted. Moreover, it seems that the act of intellection is something more pleasant and superior to anything that can exist in us. He said: ‘The highest pleasure is the pleasure that is the highest in understanding and intellect.’[19] However, since in this stage the intellect and the intelligible are the same thing, it becomes the subject of pleasure, as it is the one who takes pleasure. Who is thinking himself takes pleasure in himself, which is the real pleasure. The intellect, therefore, is what takes pleasure in itself. [20]

In sum, Ibn Rušd introduces pleasure as something that is beyond all conflict because it is beyond all sources of conflict which are the senses. Sorrow cannot contradict pleasure here because pleasure becomes something that is beyond all affections, it becomes independent of the passions, as Alexander of Aphrodisias said.[21] Moreover, it depends on an intellect like a shadow depends on its body. Since pleasure is a result of an intellectual apprehension that is beyond all lack of knowledge, there is no interruption in this pleasure because of the persistence and the stability of the intellectual apprehension.

3. Commentary on Politics: the true pleasure

Ibn Rušd links the destiny of politics to a conception of an ultimate pleasure. However, at the end of his Commentary on Plato’s Politics he presents a special conception of pleasure that agrees with what he said in the Long Commentary on the Metaphysics. One can find in both books a metaphysical meaning of pleasure and a kind of approximation between Plato, Aristotle and Alexander of Aphrodisias.

In fact, pleasure is a meetings point of the end of the Commentary on Politics the Long Commentary on Metaphysics. Since pleasure, psychologically speaking, belongs to sensation, it remains a subject of contradiction, sorrow and sadness. However, the Commentary on Politics says clearly that real pleasure should be beyond all pain: ‘pleasant things do not require, as such, to be preceded by an opposite.’[22] He said in the Long Commentary on Metaphysics that apprehension and pleasure go together; I mean that the first is the cause of the second. Here, in the Commentary on politics, he stressed this causality. he said ‘As with most intellectual pleasures, they become better as the intellect performs them.’[23] Thus, if the apprehension of the intellect is beyond all ignorance, the pleasure is beyond all pain.

 According to reading of Ibn Rušd, The conclusion of Plato is: ‘The pleasure of the intellect has no opposite. Thus, [a pleasure] is either eternal or it perishes owing to a change that comes over it.’ Ibn Rušd said about this conclusion: ‘This argument-upon my life!- is a demonstrative argument’. [24]  It appears that the climax of politics is metaphysic in Ibn Rušd.

4. Nature, change and habit

Since pleasure is a goal that everyone wants to obtain, it requires some means. Ibn Rušd enumerates many means. However, what I intend to emphasize is what he names ‘arts and exercises’ as an introduction to the pleasure. He defines them as the activities that intend to acquire a skill. However, there is a prominent difference between them regarding pleasure.

There are two kinds of arts and activities regarding pleasure: some of them are pleasuring from the beginning, such as hunting and playing chess. Such activities offer every user pleasure, even if he is a beginner. However, some arts cause fatigue and harm in the beginning. Such arts require habit and time before they became enjoyable. Among these arts, Ibn Rušd mentions art of wisdom, learning sciences.[25]  Nevertheless, since time and habit are two requirements of such arts, there are some means to help get used to. Repetition is one of these means, because repeating one particular thing becomes enjoyable because by this repetition this particular thing appropriates the soul. Then, the repetitive is enjoyable. [26] Thus, when philosophy or knowledge appropriates the soul of the man it becomes the unique subject of pleasure, since the man is already inclined with all his soul toward the knowledge. Ibn Rušd said: ‘For when someone’s desire fixes on something with the utmost intensity, his soul is deflected from the other desires.’[27] However, Ibn Rušd in turn hints that this repetition may lead the soul to tire of the repeated thing. The repetition might deprive the soul to apprehend a new thing. He explains that by the fact that the soul feels that it has satisfied it need of the present thing, especially when it takes a long time, then it looks for relief from it through something else, which can provide it with some new benefit and new experience. [28]  In this context, the new thing becomes more enjoyable, which means “Changing and movement from state to state are delicious of course, because the soul will benefit by feeling something new.”[29] Indeed, the definition of pleasure is exactly this pleasurable movement from one state to another.

Persistence here is not always a feature of true pleasure. Moreover, it can be a source of boredom. While the motion of the soul from a state to another can cause pleasure. Similarly, analogy as syllogism is a kind of transmission (movement, way, method) from one state to another one.

5. Analogy and the thrill of the discovery

Analogy is one of those things that make it easier to obtain a new knowledge. Since learning leads human being to become ‘wonderful and admired’, learning becomes pleasant. [30]  Moreover, since learning is a kind of apprehension, it becomes pleasant, because it achieves this apprehension, which means that learning is an apprehension in act. Thus, since apprehension is pleasant, it becomes more pleasant when its subject is pleasant. Ibn Rušd mentions among these pleasant subjects, making links and similarities between things.[31]  Therefore, pleasure is recognizing, discovering or reconstructing these connections between things that exist in the world.

Then, how do analogy and learning become pleasant? At first glance, since recognizing the connections between similar things is a subject of a natural desire, the pleasure will be in comparing between these things. Therefore, pleasure goes together with knowledge and analogy. In other words, via analogy, one learns and enjoys. Even more, analogy itself is pleasant because when one imagines or imitates something that should exist, the pleasure is not in the beauty or the ugliness of this image, the pleasure lies in this analogical process, I mean in this movement from what is already known, as a premise in syllogism, to what is not known yet (question). [32] This epistemological side of analogy is what attracts Ibn Rušd more than other sides. One may say that the pleasure is in the movement. It seems that is true because analogy is a kind of transmission of mind from a particular to another. Through analogy the human mind moves from one state to another, then this movement is suitable to the mind because of the likeness that is between the premise and the question.

6. Pleasure and changed statement: mediating between ignorance and knowledge

As is well known, Ibn Rušd refuses everything based on chance. To get a conviction means to master the art of rhetoric. This does not mean that everybody can get a conviction by chance. However, chance cannot found the art. Thus, the conviction is a result of an art. The art of rhetoric requires a good use of words as well as of statements and arguments.

Both, rhetoric and poetics share some means, especially some imaginative means, but there is a difference between them at the degree of imagination both in terms or in arguments. Moreover, rhetorical statements cannot get conviction without these three means: a good understanding, pleasuring, and wondering. These means shared between rhetoric and poetic but only up to a point. Ibn Rušd said: ‘The excellence of rhetoric or poetic statement and their best only is obtained by the change (Taġyyīr).’[33] Change here means using metaphorical and analogical words. Changed words are useful to indicate something that was not known yet by the listener, or if, it was not complete. [34] In fact, neither the statements that composed of usual words cannot give an additional meaning for the audience, nor the statement consist of the very strange words (Asmā’ ġarība). In sum, the good statement manages to give this additional meaning by the means of two things: First, avoiding usual and common words (al mustawliyya); second avoiding the exaggeration in the changed words, because in this case the audience cannot understand the connection between the part of metaphor or comparison.[35] Thus using change statement with these two precautions may provide what we call a nice statement that joins the three features: understanding, pleasuring, and wondering or strangeness. Via the strangeness that exists in it, the changed words (al asma’ al-mugayyira) give an extra meaning to the subject, like when original inhabitants wonder of strangers when they see them for the first time. This is the case of the changed words, which are strange and wonder when they are heard for the first time.[36]

Ibn Rušd concludes: Thus, the good persuasion ‘happened by the usual words that are not known all the knowledge nor completely unknown, but medium in between. Since The use of analogy is very useful in philosophy and in this (=art of rhetoric), I mean if the user envisaged to use analogy in this case of the medium between ignorance and knowledge, as well as the user or words in rhetoric.’ [37]

7. Good arguments: analogy and production of pleasure

Length and composition are not delicious either in metaphor and change or in analogy (or paradigma) and enthymeme. The soul is not eager to a long and composed analogy, and cannot find any pleasure in it, also it happens to the souls that do not find any pleasure in remote and composed metaphors. [38] In this way, making analogies and enthymemes from evident things, which everybody knows and does not require its examination, does not work in the art of rhetoric. Arguments like that should be ridiculous. Neither, should meaning be when it is said inapprehensible or difficult to understand, nor should it be, when it is said, is known from the beginning. [39] One can construct a syllogism from the things that are very clear but it will not be pleasurable, as well as one can make people understand by using the true words (non metaphorical of changed) but nobody can get any pleasure from them. If this is so, the good words and arguments that must be used in rhetoric (representation and conscience) are those that join the two things: a good quality of understanding and pleasuring. This can be achieved only if the analogy and change ‘misleads a little thought, I mean, they are understood after a small meditation.’[40] Averroes allows only a small space for metaphor to mislead – not for the purpose of misleading, but in order to move the soul, for a small space, to think.

8. Imitations and pleasures in Poetry

The purpose of poetry is to imagine something or represent it by means of speech.[41] The purpose of the imagination or representation is either a practical purpose, moving souls towards something or escaping it; or an impractical purpose, which is creating a strange (wonder) given to the pleasure that one gets from this imagination.[42] In fact, one does not get pleasure for the content and matter of the imagination, but for the act of imagination itself. Thus, Ibn Rušd joins what al-Farābī said in his Philosophy of Aristotle, [43] but he underlines too what he already said in his Middle Commentary on Rhetoric.[44] Ibn Rušd stresses the distinction between the pleasure you get from the things perceived and the pleasure you get from intangible things. Food is delicious, but when it is eaten, the art of decoration imagines sensible things but it is not these things; I mean that you get pleasure from imagination, representation, and not from the sensation. Imaginative speech, here, does not provide us with a complete perception, that is, they do not make us to understand the essence of the thing, but it only represents it. But this representation is enough to get both pleasure, via the act of imagination, and knowledge via the image of the thing. [45]

Ibn Rušd presents, as did Aristotle, two reasons to the rise of poetry, both combined with the concept of pleasure and its affiliates of delight and joy. ‘Poetical speech is an imaginative imitative speech.’[46] Thus, to talk about the generation of poetry means in this context to talk about the rise of imitation and comparison.

Ibn Rušd presents comparison and imitation as ‘natural,’ or rather as something that exists for a mankind from the beginning of his life, I mean something that practiced by mankind since his childhood and continue to do so, after greatness. One may realize here that metaphors of childhood are not those of old age, and comparisons of children are not those of poets. What Ibn Rušd would like to focus on the most is that process that we call analogy or comparison is ‘something specific to the man without other animals.’ [47] The reason why analogy and comparison are a property of the human is the pleasure; I mean that only man is he who finds pleasure in making analogy, comparing between the things. That the human delights, rejoices and enjoy to establish the links between things. Pleasure and happiness that felt by the human are a result of this process of comparing and imitating objects, they are not linked to the senses like other pleasures caused by other desires. The comparison here is not a means to get sensual pleasure as is the case of food or drink. The pleasure here is the outcome of the analogy itself, the process of metaphor itself. Thus, this ‘abstract’ pleasure free from ‘sense’ and resulting from the process of analogy is what is distinctive of human beings. For this reason humans use these imaginative means to make people understand and help them get some knowledge. [48]

The bottom line is that analogy in poetry is not only the cause of pleasure, but also of knowledge. When one gets mastery of imitations, metaphors, and comparisons, the interlocutor gets an understanding accompanied with an ‘intellectual pleasure’, which stems from smooth understanding of to that subject.


One can deduce two major conclusions, one based on the data of Commentaries on Rhetoric and Poetics, while the other from the commentaries on metaphysics and politics. However, the two conclusions find their epistemological basis in the Commentaries on De Anima and Prior Analytics.

According to the Commentaries on Rhetoric and poetics, it appears that metaphor, change, analogy and comparison are in the service of a kind of human happiness. Man generally enjoys the establishment of similarities and comparisons, not only in view of the knowledge derived from these similarities and comparisons, but also of pleasure that he gets from them. Analogy and comparison are delicious, and their pleasure are not based on the subject or the sensual content, but in the process of analogy itself, I mean In this process of transmission logically from known premises to unknown and epistemologically from the ignorance to the knowledge, and psychologically from the sorrow of ignorance of the delight of knowledge. Rhetorical and poetical pleasures are pleasures of knowledge, whether natural or acquired.

Nevertheless, two desires co-exist in Ibn Rušd: in one side linking pleasure with human faculties (and then, with analogy); and, in the other, elevating the pleasure to the purity and permanence of the intellect (the divine intellect). In sum, there are two kinds of pleasure, a human pleasure that one can gets by means of some arts like rhetoric and poetry, and some insight gained by comparison, imitation and analogy, which supports the logical affiliation of rhetorical and poetical statements. There is yet another pleasure, a divine pleasure that only some humans can get only in rare moments.

To achieve the last task Ibn Rušd liked the politics and metaphysics, Plato and Aristotle. One may say that it was a kind of ‘platonization’ of pleasure. I reply yes, but only up to a point. According to his statements in his Commentaries on Politics and Metaphysic, it seems that there was a kind of ‘Aristotelization’ of Plato, perhaps by the help of Alexander of Aphrodisias.

[1] – I presented a first version of this paper in Freising at SIEPM Conference “Pleasures of Knowledge”, August 20–25, 2012. I would like to thank the DAAD scholarship for the generous grant and Thomas Institute, Köln, for the warm hospitality.

[2] – See, for example, Stephen Halliwell, “Pleasure, Understanding and Emotion in Aristotle’s Poetics’,” in Rorty, A. (ed.) Essays on Aristotle’s Poetics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992) p. 241-60; The Aesthetics of Mimesis (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002) 177–206.

[3]-Salim Kemal, The Philosophical Poetics of Al-farabi, Avicenna and Averroes, the Aristotelian Reception (London / New York: Routledge Curzon, 2003). Deborah Black, Logic and Aristotle’s Rhetoric and Poetics in Medieval Arabic Philosophy (Leiden-New York: København-Köln- Brill, 1990).

[4]-Averroès (Ibn Rušd), Commentaire Moyen à la Rhétorique d’Aristote, vol. II: Introduction édition et traduction et introduction et notes de Maroun Aouad (Paris: Vrin, 2002) 1. 11. 1.

[5]Commentaire Moyen à la Rhétorique, 1. 7. 29.


[7] Commentaire Moyen à la Rhétorique, 1. 11. 4.

[8] Commentaire Moyen à la Rhétorique, 1. 11. 2.

[9] Commentaire Moyen à la Rhétorique, 1. 11. 6.

[10] Commentaire Moyen à la Rhétorique, 1. 11. 10.

[11] – Averroes, Middle Commentary on Aristotle’s De anima, A Critical Edition of the Arabic Text with the English Translation, Notes, and Introduction by Alfred L. Ivry (Provo, Utah: Brigham Young University Press, 2002) p. 50§ 131.

[12] – Especially, where Averroes deals with education, I mean the impact of the statements that use metaphor and analogies on guards and children.

[13] – Ibn Rušd, Tafsīr mā baʿd al-Ṭabiʿa (Long Commentary on the Metaphysics) Texte arabe inédit établi par Maurice Bouygues (Beyrouth: Dar El-Machreq, 1993) 1616-1618.

[14] Long Commentary on the Metaphysics, 1616.

[15] Long Commentary on the Metaphysics, 1616.

[16] Long Commentary on the Metaphysics, 1618.

[17] Commentaire Moyen à la Rhétorique, 1. 11. 10.

[18] Long Commentary on the Metaphysics, 1616.

[19]Long Commentary on the Metaphysics, 1616.

[20]Long Commentary on the Metaphysics, 1616-1617.

[21]Long Commentary on the Metaphysics, 1618.

[22] – Ralph Lerner, Averroes on Plato’s Republic, Translated, with an Introduction and Notes by Ralph Lerner (Ithaca:  Cornell University Press, 1974) p. 146.

[23] – Ralph Lerner, Averroes on Plato’s Republic, p. 147.

[24] – Ralph Lerner, Averroes on Plato’s Republic, p. 147.

[25] Commentaire Moyen à la Rhétorique, 1. 11. 19.

[26] Commentaire Moyen à la Rhétorique, 1. 11. 26.

[27] – Erwin Rosenthal, Averroes’ Commentary on Plato’s Republic, edition and translation E.I. J. Rosenthal, (Cambridge: Cambridge, University Press, 1956) p. 178.

[28] Commentaire Moyen à la Rhétorique, 1. 11. 26.

[29] Commentaire Moyen à la Rhétorique, 1. 11. 27.

[30] Commentaire Moyen à la Rhétorique, 1. 11. 28.

[31] Commentaire Moyen à la Rhétorique, 1. 11. 32.

[32] Commentaire Moyen à la Rhétorique, 1. 11. 32.

[33] Commentaire Moyen à la Rhétorique, 3. 2. 1.

[34] Commentaire Moyen à la Rhétorique, 3. 2. 1.

[35] Commentaire Moyen à la Rhétorique, 3. 2. 1.

[36] Commentaire Moyen à la Rhétorique, 3. 2. 4.

[37] Commentaire Moyen à la Rhétorique, 3. 11. 6.

[38] Commentaire Moyen à la Rhétorique, 3. 10. 3.

[39] Commentaire Moyen à la Rhétorique, 3. 10. 4.

[40] Commentaire Moyen à la Rhétorique, 3. 10. 4. And Maroun Aouad, Averroès. Commentaire moyen à la Rhétorique, vol. I (Introduction générale) p. 115. Salim kemal, The Philosophical Poetics of Al-farabi, Avicenna and Averroes, the Aristotelian Reception, p. 129-130.

[41] Averroes, Short Commentary on Aristotle’s “Poetics”, in Averroes, Three Short Commentaries on Aristotle’s “Topics”, “Rhetoric”, and “Poetics”, edited abd translated by Charles Butterworth (New York, Albany State University of New York Press, 1977) § 4.

[42] Averroes, Short Commentary on Aristotle’s “Poetics”, § 1.

[43] – Al-Farabi, Philosophy of Plato and Aristotle, translated with an introduction by Muhsin Mahdi (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1969) p. 72-74§ 2. And Salim Kemal, The Philosophical Poetics of Al-farabi, Avicenna and Averroes, p. 67-68

[44] Commentaire Moyen à la Rhétorique, 1. 11. 32.

[45] Averroes, Short Commentary on Aristotle’s “Poetics”, § 1.

[46]Averroes, Middle Commentary on Aristotle’s “Poetics”, translated and introduced by Charles Butterworth (Princeton : Princeton University Press, 1986) § 3.

[47] – Charles Butterworth, AverroesMiddle Commentary on Aristotle’s Poetics, § 4.

[48]Averroes, Middle Commentary on Aristotle’s “Poetics”, § 13.

Philosophia 4/2012, pp. 3-14