Kamalika Roy
Abstract. The problem of other minds has not received much focus in philosophy of mind. To attempt a reasonable solution of it, we need to know what is meant by the concerned problem. How is it related to the other problems of philosophy of mind? While discussing the first query, we see that two interrelated, but mutually discernable gaps are involved here, viz., are others also conscious/minded beings? If they are, what are their mental states/consciousness like? Regarding the first gap, we can have definite answer via various scientific methods. Regarding the second gap, we don’t have a definite answer till now, but we can attempt to venture through a kind of analogical reasoning. Also, we need to take into consideration the recent scientific developments in the field of artificial intelligence. Thus, it is concluded that, the problem of other minds is not a totally unbridgeable gap.
PDF Keywords: Other minds, consciousness, explanatory gap, philosophical zombie, minded beings, behavioral adaptability, neurological evidence, analogical reasoning
- Introduction
The arena of philosophy of mind is fraught with some notorious problems like the mind-body problem, place of mind in the physical world etc. which have captivated philosophers & scientists alike since ancient times. However, there are other problems also that don’t get completely overshadowed by the popularity of these ones and deserve more focus in their own merit, than has been given. The problem of other minds is such a problem. Roughly speaking, it means the problem of knowing whether other persons around us have mental states/consciousness or not (I am not going to cover here the debate of equalizing mind & consciousness as it does not fall within the scope of this paper; so I am using these two terms interchangeably, as is done by most of the philosophers, for the ease of our discussion). The problem of other minds is an issue which calls for detailed discussion of its own. So this needs to clarify the basic assumptions involved here & bring out the actual issue that is to be addressed, and only then, we can hope for a purported solution. This discussion is directed towards that end. So the plan of this paper is like—after this introduction, I shall discuss what is actually meant by the problem of other minds and clarify two intertwined questions or gaps in this regard; in the next section, we shall see why the discussion of this problem is necessary, that is, where lies the pertinence of this issue; in the two subsequent sections, I shall discuss in detail about the attempts to address those two gaps, one by one respectively, where the first attempt is based on scientific evidences and the attempt regarding the second one involves a new kind of philosophical speculation; and finally, I shall conclude the paper by summarizing the points & limitations, if any, of our concerned issue, as brought out in the light of the discussion of this paper.
- What is meant by the concerned problem?
Very roughly speaking, the problem of other minds is concerned with the issue of knowing others’ mental states. It has been formulated variously by various thinkers. Jaworski[1] rightly points out that the problem of other minds is the result of the tension between our objective knowledge of human behavior and subjective knowledge of our own mental states. We, as social beings, live among others and this requires our understanding of others’ feelings, thoughts etc. But what enables this understanding or knowledge of others’ feelings, thoughts etc., is perplexing. Because it may seem that we get to know, what others are going through mentally, via their actions, their behaviors. But there being no direct access to those mental states, it is fairly possible that we are being duped into thinking that the other person is having such & such feelings, or even have any feeling at all. Just as we can hide our actual mental states & just put on a fake behavior, similarly someone’s behavior might be carried on just by physiological processes & lacking any presence of conscious states. Whatever be the case, we can’t judge reliably from the outside. In Wittgenstein’s[2] opinion, the problem of other minds is a conceptual problem that arises due to the fact that, we fix the meaning of mental concepts by reference to our own mental states; so, we can’t meaningfully attribute those mental concepts in case of others too, because mental states being private, nobody knows whether others also have that particular state or something else. Koch’s[3] opinion is mentioned worthy in this regard, he contends that, the absence of reproducible, willful behavior is not always a sure sign of unconsciousness and on the other hand, the presence of some behaviors likewise is not always a definite indication of consciousness. As can be seen, all these accounts express the same problem.
Now, if we think about it more deeply, we shall see that the stated issue involves two intertwined problems, the distinction of which is often overlooked, leading to a failed attempt of its redressal. One question is whether other persons have mental states or consciousness. The second one is what it is like to be them, i.e. what is their experience like? How does it feel to be them? That is, the second question deals with the feelings of their lived experience. So to paraphrase these two questions in easy words, the first one asks if other persons have any mental states or consciousness at all, and the second one asks about the feelings of those mental states. That is, the first one needs to be answered in yes or no, an objective answer, and the second one requires an answer in terms of qualitative experience, or one’s feelings (the philosophers’ term ‘qualia’ needs to be considered here), which is a subjective answer. If & only if, logically speaking, the answer to the first question is yes, proceeding to attempt any answer to the second question will make any sense.
These two questions can also be rendered as another kind of explanatory gap in philosophy of mind (the important & famous one being the explanatory gap between the mental & the physical realm mentioned by Levine[4]). Because regarding the first question, perception of the behaviors of others doesn’t entitle us to be sure whether that person is conscious or not; even the perception of the apparently most convincing behaviors leaves open the possibility of that other person being merely a philosophical zombie. In case of the second question, granted that there is really anything like other minds, no matter how much we try to introspect our own experience & speculate or imagine about others’ experience, there is always the abyss of what they are actually feeling & what we are speculating them to feel, which is obvious from the widely known philosophical issue of subjective–objective gap or the first person person-third person gap. This means that in both cases, even after knowing so much about others always leaves open a gap that doesn’t close from all those explanations.
- The pertinence of this problem
My objective in this paper, after discerning the two interrelated but often overlooked questions or gaps, is to look for ways to bridge those gaps, if possible. But before we venture to find out any answer to the gaps stated above, we need to know what the pertinence of the problem of other minds is, why do we even bother about it?
If we think about it, we can see that this problem is not disconnected with the other obstinate problems of philosophy of mind. Knowing if others are conscious involves knowing who are conscious & how much alike or unlike their consciousness is compared to us. This question about who are conscious is another important problem, known as distribution problem of consciousness, which deals with how much distributed consciousness is in the biological, or broadly speaking, in the physical world. Besides, the likeness or distinction of consciousness, be it degree wise or quality wise, helps us to understand the evolution of consciousness. This is directly linked with another important issue of philosophy of mind, which deals with the origin of consciousness. This in turn is helpful in settling a major & most articulated problem of consciousness—the mind-body relation, and the issue of mind’s place in this physical world.
Apart from these philosophical enquiries, our daily life too hinges upon the assumption that others around us are conscious beings like us. Unless others are also conscious beings, any kind of communication, moral responsibility etc. won’t be meaningful either. Ethical judgement, legal judgement etc. depend upon the implicit assumption of whom to hold responsible for their actions which stems from their consciousness (we don’t judge any being ethically or legally if it a non-conscious thing). This issue is pertinent not only for humans, i.e. query about the supposed consciousness of fellow human beings, but also for other creatures, and in extension, to nonbiological beings too. Because in daily life, we interact with or deal with not only human beings, but also other animals. Traditionally, most of the scientists & even many notable philosophers like Descartes have believed that nonhuman creatures are not conscious, they are merely biological automaton, or to use philosophical jargon, merely philosophical zombie. This kind of attitude directly impacts how we treat other creatures. Not considering them as fellow conscious beings leads to our misuse of & mistreatment directed upon them, which is reflected in animal slaughtering, laboratory tests, killing them for our luxury purpose etc. Just as we don’t inflict harm purposefully on any human being, considering him/her a fellow being capable of experiencing just like us, similarly whether we suppose other creatures to be conscious would affect us positively, leading to treating them as fellow organisms deserving more compassion & respect on our part. Answering the second question, i.e. what it is like to be them, or the qualitative feeling of their existence would help us to determine to what extent we should take measures to not mistreat them for fulfilment of our own purpose.
Knowing who is conscious & to what extent, is particularly becoming relevant in modern times in the context of artificial intelligence also. With the huge strides in the field of artificial intelligence, the boundaries traditionally demarcating conscious beings from non-conscious ones are getting blurred. This is concerning for many thinkers who take this blurriness to be a sign of the artificial intelligence surpassing human beings, and even being an imminent danger to humankind. Many moral questions also are starting to arise in this regard. So the question of other minds in this regard, i.e. whether artificial intelligent beings are conscious, or have mental states, and if they do, how is their subjective experience, is very much pertinent in these cases that even go beyond the biological realm.
- Regarding the first gap
Regarding the first gap, i.e. the question whether others have consciousness/mental states or not, we need to know first, when something is accepted as conscious/minded being, i.e. upon fulfilling which condition/conditions something can be called as conscious. Identifying such essential aspects of consciousness and detecting in which beings those are present will enable us to bridge the first gap. Let’s see what the scientific & philosophical literature says about these:
i) Essential aspects of consciousness: One thing that both scientists & philosophers accept is that a being can be held as conscious if it is capable of subjective experiencing, or having any kind of awareness, from an egocentric point of view and that consciousness is expressed by its action. A conscious being isn’t merely capable of experience, it shapes or regulates its way of existence in the light of its experience or depending on its mental states. This is reflected in its goal-directed behavior & learning to cope with novel situations. Ginsburg & Jablonka’s[5]proposal of Unlimited Associative Learning or UAL is worthy of mentioning in this regard. However, there may be cases where a suspected being doesn’t show regulation of its action, does that mean that it is not a conscious being? We shall come to this question while discussing the following point. Above all, a conscious being is not merely a system that responds to stimuli in a preprogrammed way, be it programmed by nature, or by human beings.
ii) Ways of detecting consciousness: Like many other philosophical problems, our concerned problem also suffers from the limitation of relying too much on merely theorizations which is seen in the never-ending cycle of argument & counterargument, without having much substantial basis. Thus, it would be better if we base our contention upon solid scientific evidence and see where it gets us. That is why some contentions in support of other minds, like- the argument from best explanation, analogical argument etc. are not focused upon here. The limitation of these kinds of approach has already been brought out in the second section of this paper. So, for the stated purpose, here I am going to talk about only the methods proposed & used by scientific community. One more thing that needs to be mentioned here is that use of language as a way of detecting others’ mental states is deliberately omitted here, as it is claimed to be a thing of human monopoly. As we are considering whether other beings, not only humans, but also nonhuman creatures, have mental states or not, we should remain open to take into account the most basic traits reflective of consciousness/ mental states found in all of them, not just in a specific species. So, something like language that is arguably a trait of the species with the highest level of consciousness is not considered a suitable method for our purpose.
Now let’s proceed with the scientific evidence-based ways of detecting consciousness/mental states in others.
Behavioral method: Although we saw in the discussion of the second section that, behaviors don’t suffice to posit consciousness or mental states in others, still it is an important way that can’t be downplayed totally, especially if we bear in mind & try to avoid the limitations of behavioral method. Determining the presence of consciousness in others depending on their behavior can happen through many ways.
a) Versatile adaptability – Griffin[6] has mentioned, contrary to the traditional position of scientists, that apart from human beings, many non-human creatures also are capable of subjective experiencing and various types of scientific evidence provide us ‘promising insight into what life is like for various animals’. So, we can consider this evidence as methods of detecting or determining consciousness in creatures suspected to have mental states. The first type of evidence mentioned by Griffin is the versatility that is reflected in the adjustment of behavior of many creatures when they face novel challenges. This versatile adjustability is brought out in the food finding activities, predation, construction of artefacts, use of tools & special devices, and use of categories & concepts. Food finding activities can be of many kinds, ranging from taking foraging decisions to food storing activities. Predation is another kind of behavior which, bringing out the versatility of adjustment of both the predator & prey animals, is suggestive of consciousness on part of the creatures. This is because the very activities of catching a prey and escaping the clutch of the predators are situations which require conscious thinking. Construction of artefacts, express various intentions of the concerned animals (e.g. protection from predators & unfavorable situations, attracting a mate etc.) that are indicative of their conscious thoughts & feelings. Tool making activities also are mentioned worthy evidence of consciousness, since selection or preparation of a tool indicates that the animal is aware of the purpose that is to be served by the tool. Griffin has mentioned some examples to show that some animals are capable of categorizing & conceptualizing, which is shown in their expectations, numerical competence, learning simple abstract rules, learning & discrimination between stimuli etc. This too, according to him, constitutes evidence in support of animal consciousness.
b) Communication. A second kind of evidence is also mentioned by Griffin which is communication. Communicative behavior often is overlooked but is nonetheless one important kind of way of detecting consciousness. Its importance is brought out, remarks Griffin[7], by the fact that, the experience of animals of their conscious thoughts & feelings are very likely to accompany social behavior & interactions between predators and prey; that is, communication being a two-way process enables animals to exchange signals and evaluate each other’s feelings & thoughts besides their probability of behaving in various ways. Griffin has enumerated various kinds of communicative behavior, each comprising several kinds of behaviors, viz., — communicative behavior which testifies conscious thinking, communicative behavior which symbolically conveys information, communicative behavior which are employed to deceive &/or manipulate other animals etc.
c) Zombie test. Tye[8] (2017, 162) proposes a zombie test to detect if any organism is conscious. According to him, our conscious mental states allow us to behave in flexible way in response to stimuli. So the idea behind the test is that, different stimuli, even the very same type of stimuli at different times elicits variation in response; so where there is no flexibility or very little flexibility, in the behavior of some organism in response to even the same type of stimulus, it is clear that no mental state, i.e., no experience, is operative there which could bring out varied response. Using this zombie test to living things, we can detect which are conscious ones, i.e., which organisms are not merely behaving mechanically, without any inner feel or subjective experience.
Neuroscientific method: Besides behavioral methods, there is another type of scientific evidence that is used in research, laboratory tests & medical purposes successfully which can be labelled as neuroscientific methods. Search for NCC or Neural Correlates of Consciousness which is arguably an important way of settling the perennial problem of mind-body relation, comes under this banner. Although the search for NCC may not be a convincing solution to the said infamous problem, it is important evidence in our present context. Because, correlating consciousness or mental states, specifically or holistically, to some kind of neural architecture or process provides evidence of the presence of consciousness or mental states in the concerned creature when the said neural correlate is present in it. Such neurological evidence is brought out by scientific methods like EEG (Electroencephalogram), FMRI (Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging) etc. So, analyzing neuroanatomical evidence, we can know whether the other person suspected of having consciousness/mental states do really possess it or not. However, there are many human beings who can’t verbally or behaviorally express whether they are conscious or not. In cases of humans who are either in vegetative state, or in a coma, the above-mentioned ways fail to detect the presence of consciousness if there is any. In such cases, an effective way to detect it is TMS (Transcranial magnetic stimulation) which uses Perturbational Complexity Index or PCI which is free of the shortcomings of sensory & motor behavior, and willful behavior. Besides these methods in case of humans (& even other vertebrate animals like primates, rodents etc.), neuroethological method has also been proposed to determine if any invertebrate creature is conscious. Barron & Klein[9] has suggested, utilizing anatomical analysis & new electrophysiological studies, that despite anatomical differences, similar functional role of consciousness, as of humans & other vertebrates, is played by the brain of invertebrate creatures like insects, and their neurobiological mechanisms generate adaptive behavior which is indicative of their consciousness.
So here we see that behavior, not any kind of behavior, but only goal-directed & adaptive ones, is an important way to know whether others are minded beings too. If we are cautious enough to rule out mere stimulus-response behavior, that are driven by homeostasis as preprogrammed by nature, and strengthen it with the neuroscientific methods, then these provide strong evidence to know if others too are conscious or have mental states. Now after enumerating the evidential methods to detect other minds, let’s see how these have been employed & thereby attempt an answer to our first question or gap by identifying who are conscious. For this purpose, we can present the detection of consciousness, existing in creatures in a decrescent manner, as following:
Human beings: Perhaps the most indubitable sphere of presence of consciousness/ mental states is the human beings. Basic consciousness, as well as other high-level aspects of consciousness, can be easily identified in normal human beings through a number of ways. Their verbal report, introspection, sensory & motor behavior, free choice of action among various alternatives, creativity, dreaming, various neuroscientific methods (e.g., E.E.G., F.M.R.I., T.M.S. etc.) & laboratory experiments etc. attest to their claims of being conscious.
Nonhuman creatures: In case of nonhuman creatures, we can find their verbal & behavioral expression too, as is evident from the human-animal communication, found mostly in houses with pet or animal lover persons. But some people question the presence of consciousness in them as the animals can’t express their mental states in human language, or their behaviors are somewhat different from that of human beings. However, their ways may be different, but still, they can express it in their own way. In this regard, an important way to detect consciousness is to see whether the said organisms are capable of unlimited associative learning. Using those criteria, it is found that all vertebrates, and some invertebrates, including some arthropods & a few cephalopods only, are conscious. Some recent researchers[10] have questioned the exclusion of plants, bacteria, fungi, protozoa etc. organisms from the sphere of conscious/minded beings. However, there are more compelling recent evidence[11] [12]which show that the alleged proof of ‘neurobiology in plants’ or intelligent responses of bacteria, fungi, protozoa etc. are just proof of homeostatic drives, and even their apparently most convincing behavior are merely genetically programmed by nature, reflecting no sign of mental state or conscious intention on part of them.
Nonliving things: Nonliving things ranging from ordinary material objects like chair, tables, mountain etc. to scientifically engineered objects like robots, artificial intelligent machines show neither of the above-mentioned evidence. Of course, we should be wary of not suggesting any kind of neuronal chauvinism in this context, i.e. we should not presuppose from beforehand that mental states are found only in creatures with nervous system; because that would be a biased perspective & would just be an assumption of what we are looking answer for, rendering it a case of begging the issue. So absence of neuroanatomical evidences should not be counted in itself to be proving these type of things as non-minded beings. But we can look for whether the essential aspect of mental states/consciousness, which have been discussed earlier in this section, can be seen in these things suspected of having minds. It is seen in this regard that the concerned objects don’t show any kind of goal-directed & adaptive behavior in novel situation or in response to novel stimuli. Robots and other artificially intelligent beings who are sometimes thought to be posing a danger to humankind due to their gradual advancement in intelligence, regardless of how much highly intelligent they are & how skilled they are cognitively, they still behave or perform actions in accordance with some programs that human being have embedded into them while manufacturing those. Even in case of highly sophisticated AI chatbots, that seem to answer our queries perfectly, one can notice their inconsistency in replies if the chat is carried on for a long time & includes questions that are not superficial & need a subjective point of view in answers. That is, artificially intelligent beings can’t, despite its best attempts, dupe us for a long time. So, these things cannot be regarded as beings that have minds.
- Regarding the second gap
Now that we have got an answer to our first question, let’s proceed to the second one. The second gap, viz. what is the felt experience of others like, is rather unyielding to scientific evidence till now. Regardless of how much we try to show through our scientific tests what others’ mental states may be like, what we end up with is some kind of objective explanation or processes accompanying or resulting to their mental states/consciousness. But that doesn’t let us peer into others’ felt experience. So, we can, in the absence of any scientific evidence as of now yielding what others are going through mentally, only speculate. However, mere speculation can go awry, as is brought out in Thomas Nagel’s[13] seminal paper ‘What it is like to be a bat?’ There he nicely pointed out, using the example of bats that, imagining ourselves in the shoes of an organism belonging from a totally different species than ours lands us in absurd speculations.
In this regard, I think it would be great to venture through a new avenue. To do this, we need at first to be clear of the idea that I am going to propose: we human beings are very different from each other. Our differences in thinking pattern, thought process, decision making etc. are very clearly brought out in the differences of reaction to and way of handling of any particular situation. This means that, the same situation, the same environment, or to talk in technical language, the same stimuli elicit different reactions to it. This means that the contention of the argument from inverted spectrum in the context of qualia is not very much uncommon- very often there are subtle differences (and maybe big differences in some cases), varying from person to person, of how we experience something. But although we do not have the same feeling of the other person, i.e., there is always the gap of first person and third person, still, we are able to figure out what s/he is going through and act in accordance with that successfully. This grasping of others’ mental states, although they are not fully same as us, is carried out, I think, by a kind of analogical reasoning. But this analogical reasoning that I am talking about is not the same as what is proposed in the context of the problem of other minds traditionally. Its difference from the traditional one lies in the fact that generally when we see somebody responding in the same kind of way to same kind of stimuli, we infer that the other person is also feeling the same way as us in that particular kind of situation. Unlike this, I suggest that we posit how others’ mental states are by way of finding some resemblances, not necessarily specific resemblances but resemblances in pattern, between our own and their behavior, reaction etc. in response to even different kind of stimuli. E.g., suppose A & B are two friends who are nature wise very different, one is very practical & one is very emotional respectively. But this difference in nature does not come in the way of their friendship. However, there are sometimes, when there is a sort of gap in understanding each other’s feelings due to their feelings being not the same in any situation, say for example in a particular sorrowful situation. What happens at that time is that while B is moved by the situation, A is not much affected by the situation & rather accepts it as a natural turn of events. But later on, in a different occasion, A is so moved by the ongoing circumstances that s/he then realizes that B must have felt like this in the previous situation when B was reacting or behaving in an emotional manner, as A is doing now. At that moment, A, despite her/his difference of mental states or subjective experience from that of B, comes to feel the same way as B, or realizes what B’s felt experience was like, although their situations are different. This is not a merely speculative example, rather this is very common in our daily life where we live among & deal with people of very different mental setup than us. This shows that variety in mental states may not pose a problem for knowing others’ mental states or felt experiences. Now, the variation that I was talking about holds between intra species creatures (e.g., within human beings, or within other animals of same species etc.); and by extending it a bit, we can find a greater degree of difference of consciousness/mental states within inter species creatures (e.g., between humans and dogs, or dogs and cats), resulting in greater hardship requiring greater amount of effort in grasping the felt experience of other species. Now, my proposal is that, we need to extend this practice in a much larger scale, extending through different species which are much alien to each other (e.g., humans and insects, dolphins and birds etc.) on our way, and see how far we can get in grasping others’ mental states, regardless of how faint it will be, in other beings, which may include even creatures or beings not counted within our consideration previously. We just need to be on guard to avoid any chance of anthropomorphizing.
This proposal of mine may be comparable to the joint method of argument from analogy and consideration of differences of lifestyle & circumstances as suggested by Dawkins[14]. She points out that non-human creatures express their emotions, express what matters to them most, via their action, via their behavior. So, if we want to peer into whether and what their conscious experience is like, we need to take into account their actions, since any direct communication via language is not possible. Giving an example of understanding some other human being, who suffered the loss of his pet cat and hails from a different situation than oneself, the author remarks that despite such gap of emotional attachment & situation, we can & do understand other one by analogically assuming that his/her experience is somewhat relatable to our own and by taking into account the differences of life style & circumstances between that person and oneself, in order to curb our tendency to anthropomorphize.
- Conclusion
Now, after all this discussion, our conclusion can be outlined by saying that while we get a positive answer, a definite one backed by scientific evidence, to our first gap or question concerning the problem of other minds, our answer about the second one is not so hopeful of providing a definite answer supported by scientific evidence. Regarding the first question, it was seen that we can hold other beings who vertebrates are, or many arthropods, or some cephalopods as having some kind of mental states or consciousness, as was evident from their expression of the essential aspect of consciousness through behavioral & neuroscientific methods. However, regarding the second question, no scientific method, as of now, has provided any evidence to draw on a definitive answer. In that context, as I suggested, we can proceed via a new approach which is a kind of analogical reasoning.
However, from the above discussion, some corollary also came to light, like—i) answer to the problem of other minds is relevant in the realm of living things only, as is shown by scientific evidence and ii) even not all living beings have mental states. i.e., bio-psychism, which is advocated by some thinkers[15] is not true. This second corollary follows mainly from the neuroscientific methods, which are applicable to animals with developed nervous systems, when mere lack of behavioral methods is unsettling to the question of presence of consciousness or mental states (as is seen in case of unresponsive human patients). However, a great limitation of that (viz., TMS using the perturbational complexity index) is that it has been invented to determine the presence of consciousness in human beings, and by extension, this can be hopefully used on other creatures also who have a highly complex and developed body and nervous system. But this cannot be used to detect consciousness in other beings, who, devoid of any nervous system, may or may not be suspected of being conscious. We already touched this point in the previous section and there we saw that the lack of expression of the essential aspects of mental states solidifies our conclusion that only creatures with nervous system have mental states, in which respect nonliving things fail. But we may need to reconsider our thinking in the wake of latest developments in the field of artificial intelligence, like the advent of ChatGPT. Unlike its predecessors, ChatGPT functions basing on open ended learning, which is evocative of UAL in the context of goal-directed adaptive behavior in novel situations. Although this will be too early if we claim based on this feature of ChatGPT that it has mental states, it surely leads us to more questions than we can answer at this stage, based on scientific evidence.
Thus, this seems that at least the first of the two gaps mentioned in this paper has been bridged with a definitive answer, backed by scientific evidence, while it is difficult to do so in case of the second one, leaving us to rely on speculations, which path has to be trodden very cautiously. Moreover, we need to keep an eye on the advancement of the recent scientific developments which has the potential to change the answers to both gaps, by blurring the line between conscious & non-conscious, living & nonliving beings.
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Information about the author: Kamalika Roy, Ph.D. Scholar,
Visva-Bharati, Email ID- kamalika.vbu@gmail.com
[1] William Jaworski, Philosophy of Mind: A Comprehensive Introduction, (Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2011), 17
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[3] Christof Koch, The Feeling of Life, (Massachussetts: The MIT Press, 2019)
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Philosophia 32/2023, pp. 52-73
Philosophia 